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Abstract
Heightened responding to uncertain threat is considered a hallmark of anxiety disorder pathology. We sought to determine
whether individual differences in self-reported intolerance of uncertainty (IU), a key transdiagnostic dimension in anxiety-related
pathology, underlies differential recruitment of neural circuitry during cue-signalled uncertainty of threat (n = 42). In an
instructed threat of shock task, cues signalled uncertain threat of shock (50%) or certain safety from shock. Ratings of arousal
and valence, skin conductance response (SCR), and functional magnetic resonance imaging were acquired. Overall, participants
displayed greater ratings of arousal and negative valence, SCR, and amygdala activation to uncertain threat versus safe cues. IU
was not associated with greater arousal ratings, SCR, or amygdala activation to uncertain threat versus safe cues. However, we
found that high IU was associated with greater ratings of negative valence and greater activity in the medial prefrontal cortex and
dorsomedial rostral prefrontal cortex to uncertain threat versus safe cues. These findings suggest that during cue-signalled
uncertainty of threat, individuals high in IU rate uncertain threat as aversive and engage prefrontal cortical regions known to
be involved in safety-signalling and conscious threat appraisal. Taken together, these findings highlight the potential of IU in
modulating safety-signalling and conscious appraisal mechanisms in situations with cue-signalled uncertainty of threat, which
may be relevant to models of anxiety-related pathology.
Keywords Instructedthreatofshock . Intoleranceofuncertainty .Medialprefrontalcortex .Rostraldorsomedialprefrontalcortex .
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Introduction
In everyday life, we often experience uncertainty and will
typically try to minimise or resolve it to reduce anxiety and
stress (Brosschot, Verkuil, & Thayer, 2016; Grupe &
Nitschke, 2013; Hirsh, Mar & Peterson, 2012; Morriss, Gell,
& van Reekum, 2019b; Peters, McEwen, & Friston, 2017).
Individuals who score high in self-reported intolerance of un-
certainty (IU) tend to find uncertainty particularly distressing
(Carleton, 2016a, 2016b; Dugas, Buhr, & Ladouceur, 2004;
Freeston, Rhéaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994). IU
is considered a transdiagnostic dimension. High levels of IU
are observed across many mental health disorders with an
anxiety component, such as anxiety, depression, posttraumatic
stress, and obsessive-compulsive disorder (Gentes & Ruscio,
2011; McEvoy & Mahoney, 2012). On this basis, there has
been a surge in IU-related research in the field of anxiety
during the past decade (McEvoy, Hyett, Shihata, Price, &
Strachan, 2019; Tanovic, Gee, & Joormann, 2018).
Despite progress in understanding the aetiology of IU, gaps
in the literature remain as to how IUmodulates neural circuitry
associated with the processing of cue-signalled uncertainty of
threat (i.e., a cue signals whether a threat, such as an aversive
stimulus, will occur or not) (Tanovic et al., 2018). Only a
handful of studies to date have examined how IU is correlated
with neural circuitry during the anticipation of cue-signalled
uncertainty of threat (Morriss, Christakou, & Van Reekum,
2015; Schienle, Köchel, Ebner, Reishofer, & Schäfer, 2010;
Simmons, Matthews, Paulus, & Stein, 2008; Somerville et al.,
2013). In tasks where participants have been instructed about
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the likelihoods of negative or neutral pictures (i.e., visual cues
or countdowns signal the occurrence of a negative or neural
picture), individuals high in IU, relative to low IU, have been
shown to exhibit heightened amygdala and insula activity to
cues signalling unpredictable negative pictures (Schienle
et al., 2010; Shankman et al., 2014), and exaggerated amyg-
dala activity to negative pictures following unpredictable
countdowns (Somerville et al., 2013). Whilst previous work
has provided a starting point for understanding how IU mod-
ulates neural circuitry to cue-signalled uncertainty of threat,
further research is needed to assess the robustness and
generalisability of IU-related effects. For example, previous
fMRI research on the relationship between IU and cue-
signalled uncertainty of threat has primarily used negative
and neutral picture stimuli with a wide range of content. It is
important to establish whether similar patterns of neural acti-
vation to cue-signalled uncertainty of threat would be ob-
served for individuals with high IU in response to other stimuli
commonly used to evoke anxious states, such as mild electric
shock. Understanding how IU modulates neural circuitry in
relation to cue-signalled uncertainty of threat will further clar-
ify the role of IU in neurobiological (Grupe &Nitschke, 2013;
Peters et al., 2017) and clinical models of anticipation and
uncertainty in anxiety (Carleton, 2016b; Shihata, McEvoy,
Mullan, & Carleton, 2016).
To assess the relationship between self-reported IU and
anticipatory responding during cue-signalled uncertainty of
threat, we measured event-related functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging (fMRI), skin conductance response (SCR), and
arousal and valence ratings while participants performed an
instructed threat of shock task. To induce a sense of uncertain
threat, a cue signalled whether a mild electric shock to the
finger would occur (50% of the time) (i.e., participants were
told that they would sometimes receive a shock at the end of
the cued trial). Trials were 9 seconds in length (1-second cue,
8-second anticipatory period), to allow us to examine phasic
and sustained threat/safety-related activity.
We hypothesized that, during the instructed threat of shock
task, we would observe typical patterns of phasic and
sustained activation in circuitry associated with the processing
of threat and safety (Etkin, Egner, & Kalisch, 2011; Levy &
Schiller, 2021; Mechias, Etkin, & Kalisch, 2010; Morriss
et al., 2019b; Tashjian, Zbozinek, & Mobbs, 2021), i.e., (1)
greater activation in the amygdala, putamen, caudate, insula,
and rostral prefrontal cortex to threat versus safe trials, and (2)
greater medial prefrontal cortex activity to safe versus
threat trials. Moreover, we hypothesized that participants
would display greater SCR to the threat versus safe trials
and rate the threat trials as more negative and arousing than
the safe trials.
Based on past research (Morriss et al., 2015; Schienle et al.,
2010; Shankman et al., 2014; Simmons et al., 2008;
Somerville et al., 2013), we hypothesised that higher IU
would be associated with: (1) greater phasic and sustained
activation in the amygdala and insula during threat, relative
to safe trials, and (2) modulation of the medial prefrontal cor-
tex during threat, relative to safe trials. Given the shortage of
research on the relationship between IU and activation in the
medial prefrontal cortex, we did not hypothesise a particular
direction of effect. Lastly, we hypothesised that higher IU
would be associated with greater SCR to the threat versus safe
trials, as well as higher ratings of negativity and arousal to the
threat versus safe trials.
We tested the specificity of the involvement of IU by com-
paring it with broader measures of anxiety (for discussion see
(Morriss, Christakou, & Van Reekum, 2016), in this case the
Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, Trait Version (STAI-
T) (Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983).
Methods
Participants
Forty-two female volunteers were recruited from the local area
through advertisements (M age = 33 yr, SD age = 7.33 yr; 31
white Northern European, 6 white nonspecified region, 3
white Southern European, 1 multiethnic, 1 white Eastern
European). All participants reported being right-handed, hav-
ing normal or corrected-to-normal vision, being medication-
free, and having no prior history of brain injury. We did not
collect information from participants regarding current or pre-
vious history of mental health diagnoses. We selected female
participants, because the study was part of a larger programme
of research examining the role of conspecifics (i.e., romantic
partner, friend) in the processing of threat (Morriss, Bell,
Johnstone, van Reekum, & Hill, 2019a).
Participants provided written, informed consent and re-
ceived a picture of their brain and £15 for their participation.
The University of Reading’s Research Ethics Committee ap-
proved the study protocol.
Instructed threat of shock task
Participantswere required to passively view cues that represented
either threat of shock or safety from shock. Only two cues were
presented: an uncertain threat cue where there was 50% chance
of receiving a shock, and a safety cuewhere therewas 0%chance
of receiving a shock. Each trial consisted of: a white cue (e.g., X,
O, D, T) presented on a black background (1 second), a white
fixation anticipation cue presented on a black background (8
seconds), a small circle cue signalling the end of the trial (1
second), and a black blank screen (4-6 seconds) (Figure 1). In
the uncertain threat condition, the shock was administered
with the end cue 50% of the time. Participants completed 1 run
of 36 trials (18 Threat, 18 Safe). To rule out any cue-specific
Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci
effects, half the participants received X and O cues, whilst the
other half received D and T cues.
At the beginning of the experiment four practise trials (2
Threat, 2 Safe) were presented without shock on a computer
screen. While the participants were viewing these practise
trials, the experimenter explained that one of the cues would
be associated with shock and another would not. Additionally,
the experimenter explained that there would be a waiting pe-
riod and that if the shock were to occur, it would happen at the
same time as the small circle cue (Figure 1). The practise trials
were given to allow the participants to experience the trial
structure and timings. Before participants were placed in the
scanner, they were instructed via a computer screen as to
which cue would signal the possibility of a shock and which
cue would signal no shock.
Electric Shock
The possibility of receiving an unpleasant electrical shock to
the index and middle finger of the right hand was used to
induce threat. Electric shocks were delivered via an
ADInstruments ML856 PowerLab 26T Isolated Stimulator
using MRI-safe MLT117F bipolar finger electrodes. Each
participant's stimulation level was set by first exposing them
to an electric stimulation of 1 mA (10 pulses at 50 Hz, with a
pulse duration of 200 μs) and increasing the current in steps of
0.5 mA, up to a maximum of 10 mA. This continued until a
suitable participant-specific threshold was found that was un-
comfortable but not painful. This level was then used through-
out the threat of shock task for that subject (electric stimula-
tion level: M = 2.21 mA; SD = 1 mA).
Procedure
Participants arrived at the laboratory and were informed of the
experimental procedures. First, participants completed a con-
sent form as an agreement to take part in the study. Second,
participants completed questionnaires by pen and paper.
Third, participants were taken to the MRI unit, where they
were presented with example trials from the instructed threat
of shock task and the shock procedure was carried out. Next,
we presented instructions about the task contingencies, and
then participants completed an instructed threat of shock task
in the scanner whilst we concurrently recorded skin conduc-
tance. After scanning, participants rated the threat and safe
cues from the instructed threat of shock task. Ratings were
collected at the end of the scanning session rather than
throughout the task, because participants had electrodes at-
tached to both hands.
Questionnaires
To assess anxious disposition, we used Intolerance of
Uncertainty (IU) (Freeston et al., 1994) and the Spielberger
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, Trait Version (STAI-T)
(Spielberger et al., 1983). The IU scale comprises of 27 items
on a 5-point Likert scale (possible range: 20-135) and captures
aversion to uncertainty. The STAI-T comprises of 20 items on
a 4-point Likert scale (possible range: 20-80) and captures trait
anxiety. Both anxiety measures were normally distributed,
showed good internal reliability and displayed similar ranges
of scores to that of community samples (IU:M = 66.07; SD =
17.03; range = 34-102; α = 0.93; STAI-T; M = 40.92; SD =
Fig. 1 Image depicting instructed threat of shock task. Examples of threat (top row) and safe (bottom row) trial types. Participants were instructed on
threat and safe contingencies before the start of the task
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10.31; range = 25-61;α = 0.91) (Julian, 2011; Khawaja &Yu,
2010). Importantly, at least half of the sample met STAI-T
(>40) and IU (>60) scores that were comparable with clinical
samples (Julian, 2011; Khawaja & Yu, 2010).
Ratings
Participants rated the valence and arousal of the threat and safe
cues using 9-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (Valence:
negative; Arousal: calm) to 9 (Valence: positive; Arousal:
excited). One participant did not complete the ratings, leaving
41 participants with ratings data.
Skin conductance acquisition and reduction
Identical to previous work (Morriss et al., 2015), electroder-
mal recordings were obtained using AD Instruments (AD
Instruments Ltd, Chalgrove, Oxfordshire) hardware and soft-
ware. An ML138 Bio Amp connected to an ML870
PowerLab Unit Model 8/30 amplified the electrodermal sig-
nal, which was digitized through a 16-bit A/D converter at
1,000 Hz. Electrodermal activity was measured during the
scanning session with MRI-safe MLT117F Ag/AgCl bipolar
finger electrodes filled with NaCl electrolyte paste (Mansfield
R & D, St. Albans, VT) that were attached to the distal pha-
langes of the index and middle fingers of the left hand. A
constant voltage of 22mVrms at 75 Hz was passed through
the electrodes, which were connected to a ML116 GSR Amp.
Skin conductance responses (SCR) were scored when there
was an increase of skin conductance level exceeding 0.03
microSiemens. The amplitude of each SCR was scored as
the difference between the baseline (1-second average pre
cue onset) and the maximum deflection (0.5–9-second post
cue onset). Trials with no discernible SCRs were scored as
zero. SCR magnitudes were calculated by averaging SCR
values for each condition (Threat, Safe). Due to recording
errors, 2 participants did not have SCR data, leaving 40 par-
ticipants with SCR data.
Ratings and SCR analysis
We conducted a two Condition (Threat, Safe) x IU ANCOVA
for arousal ratings, valence ratings, and SCR to the cues,
where IU was entered as a continuous predictor variable.
Any interaction with IU was followed up with pairwise com-
parisons of the means between the conditions for IU estimated
at the specific values of + or − 1 SD of mean IU. This type of
analysis with IU has been previously published elsewhere
(Morriss et al., 2015, 2016).
We performed hierarchical regression analyses on the
rating/SCR difference score measures that showed an effect
with IU. This analysis served to assess IU-specific effects over
and above shared variance with trait anxiety (STAI-T). We
entered STAI-T in the first step and then IU in the second step.
MRI
Participants were scanned with a 3T Siemens Trio using a 12
channel head coil (Siemens Inc., Erlangen, Germany). T2*-
weighted gradient-echo, echo planar imaging (EPI) functional
scans were acquired for the threat of shock task consisting of
281 volumes (TR = 2,000 ms, TE = 30 ms, flip angle = 90°,
FOV = 192 × 192 mm, 3- × 3-mm voxels, slice thickness
3 mm with an interslice gap of 1 mm, 30 axial slices, inter-
leaved acquisition).
Following completion of the functional scan, structural and
fieldmap scans were acquired, which comprised of a high-
resolution, T1-weighted anatomical scan (MP-RAGE, TR =
2020 ms, TE = 2.52 ms, flip angle = 90°, FOV = 256 × 256
mm, 1- x 1- x 1-mm voxels, slice thickness 1 mm, sagittal
slices) and fieldmap (TR = 488 ms, TE 1 = 4.98 ms, TE 2 =
7.38 ms, flip angle = 60°, FOV = 256 × 256 mm, slice thick-
ness 4 mm with an interslice gap of 4 mm, 30 axial slices).
fMRI analysis
FMRI analyses were carried out in Feat version 5.98 as part of
FSL (FMRIB's Software Library, www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl).
Brains were extracted from their respective T1 images by
using the FSL Brain Extraction Tool (BET) (Smith, 2002).
Distortion, slice timing and motion correction were applied
to all extracted EPI volumes using FUGUE and MCFLIRT
tools. Gaussian smoothing (FWHM 5 mm) and a 50-second
high-pass temporal filter were applied.
A first-level GLM analysis was carried out for each func-
tional scan. Separate regressors were specified for the exper-
imental conditions of primary interest (Threat/Safety Cues) by
convolving a binary boxcar function with an ideal haemody-
namic response (HR), which corresponded to the length of
each cue (1 second) or the entire trial period (9 seconds).
Regressors for the end of trial period with and without shock
and six motion parameters (3 rotation and 3 translation) were
included to model out brain activity that was unrelated to the
conditions of interest.
In two separate general linear models, we defined two
main effect contrasts to reveal phasic and sustained threat/
safety related activity: (1) Threat vs. Safety across the 1-
second cue period, and (2) Threat vs. Safety across the
whole 9-second trial period. All contrasts were normal-
ized and registered to MNI standard space using FLIRT
(Jenkinson, Bannister, Brady, & Smith, 2002). Second-
level GLM analysis consisted of regressors for the group
mean and demeaned IU scores using FSL’s OLS proce-
dure. Whole-brain analysis was carried out with paramet-
ric statistics using cluster thresholding with a z = 2.3 and
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a corrected p < 0.05 (for fMRI results from nonparametric
permutation tests, see Supplementary Material).
We performed hierarchical regression analyses on the
resulting significant clusters that showed an association with IU
to test for specificity of IU over STAI-T. We extracted % BOLD
signal change difference scores from the relevant clusters and
correlated these with the anxiety measures to test for IU-specific
effects, by using STAI-T in the first step and then STAI-T and IU
in the second step of the hierarchical regression models.
Results
Ratings
Participants rated the threat cues as more negative (M = 4.78,
SD = 1.77) and more arousing (M = 5.78, SD = 1.68) than the
safe cue (M = 6.78, SD = 1.56 for valence andM = 2.90, SD =
2.11 for arousal respectively) [Condition (Valence): F(1,39) =
29.127, p < 0.001; Condition (Arousal): F(1,39) = 47.095, p <
0.001; Figures 2A & B]. Higher IU was associated with sig-
nificantly more negative ratings of the threat cues compared to
the safe cues, p < 0.001 [Condition (Valence) x IU interaction:
F(1,39) = 5.764, p = 0.021; Figure 2C]. IU was not signifi-
cantly related to the arousal ratings of the threat and safe cues
[Condition (Arousal) x IU interaction: F(1,39) = 0.866, p =
0.358; Figure 2D].
For the valence rating difference score (Threat cue – Safe
cue), STAI-T made no significant contribution to the model at
the first step [R2 = 0.044, F = 1.808], whilst adding IU im-
proved the hierarchal model at trend in the second step [ΔR2 =
0.086, F(1,38) = 3.746, p = 0.06].
SCR
SCR was greater to threat (M = 0.29, SD = 0.11) versus
safe (M = 0.16, SD = 0.11) trials [Condition: F(1,38) =
43.815, p < 0.001]. Higher IU was related to greater
Fig. 2 Bar graphs depicting valence and arousal ratings for threat and safe
stimuli (a & b). Higher IU was significantly associated with rating the
threat stimulus as more negative than the safe stimulus (c). IU was not
significantly related to arousal rating difference scores between threat and
safe stimuli (d). Valence, 1=negative and 9 = positive; Arousal 1 = calm,
9 = excited. Bars represent standard error
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SCR to threat versus safe trials; however, this relation-
ship was not significant [Condition x IU: F(1,38) =
3.059, p = 0.088].
fMRI
For all participants, threat versus safe cues induced greater
activation in the bilateral amygdala, insula, frontal operculum,
pre- and postcentral gyrus, paracingulate, cingulate,
supramarginal gyrus, and middle frontal gyrus (for full list
of brain regions see Table 1 & Figure 3). During threat versus
safe trial periods, activations were observed in the bilateral
insula, caudate, putamen, orbital frontal cortex, supramarginal
gyrus, middle frontal gyrus, thalamus, and brain stem (for full
list of brain regions see Table 1 & Figure 4), The reverse
contrast, safe versus threat trial period, revealed greater acti-
vation in the bilateral hippocampus, medial cortex, superior
frontal and middle frontal gyri, and precuneus (for full list of
brain regions see Table 1 & Figure 4).
For threat versus safe cues, high IU was associated with
greater activation in the medial prefrontal cortex and rostral
dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (split into two clusters, see
Table 1 & Figure 5). No significant IU-related effects were
observed for the safe versus threat contrast for the cue period.
In addition, no significant IU-related effects were found for
the contrasts from the trial period.
For the medial prefrontal cortex cluster (Threat cue – Safe
cue), STAI-T made a significant contribution to the model at
the first step [R2 = 0.220, F(1,40) = 11.301, p = 0.002], and
adding IU in the second step improved the model significantly
[ΔR2 = 0.167, F(1,39) = 10.610, p = 0.002]. Similarly, for the
rostral dorsomedial prefrontal cortex cluster (Threat cue –
Safe cue), STAI-T made a significant contribution to the mod-
el at the first step [R2 = 0.218, F(1,40) = 11.171, p = 0.002],
whilst adding IU improved the model significantly in the sec-
ond step [ΔR2 = 0.163, F(1,39) = 10.287, p = 0.003].
Discussion
In the following experiment, self-reported IUwas not found to
be associated with amygdala or insula activity during cue-
signalled uncertainty of threat. However, higher IU was spe-
cifically associated with greater recruitment of the medial pre-
frontal cortex and dorsomedial rostral prefrontal cortex to cues
that signalled uncertainty of threat of shock versus safety from
shock, over STAI-T. Furthermore, IU-related effects were
specific to the cue (phasic); we did not observe IU modulation
of neural activity during the entire trial period (sustained).
These results highlight the potential of IU-based modulation
of mechanisms related to safety-signalling and conscious
threat appraisal in anxiety disorder pathology.
In general, we found that participants recruited typical re-
gions associated with instructed threat of shock tasks (Etkin
et al., 2011; Grupe & Nitschke, 2013; Levy & Schiller, 2021;
Mechias et al., 2010; Morriss et al., 2019b; Tashjian et al.,
2021). Participants recruited greater amygdala to threat versus
safe cues (phasic), as well as greater putamen, caudate, and
insula during threat versus safe trial periods (cue + anticipa-
tion window). Moreover, participants recruited greater medial
prefrontal cortex during safe versus threat periods. As expect-
ed, greater SCR was observed to the threat versus safe trials.
Furthermore, participants rated threat cues as negative and
moderately arousing, and safe cues as moderately positive
and low in arousal.
We did not observe higher IU to differentially engage the
amygdala or insula (across the cue or entire trial period) or
display greater SCR to cues that signalled uncertainty of threat
of shock versus safety from shock. Whilst this is at odds with
previous research (Morriss et al., 2015; Schienle et al., 2010;
Shankman et al., 2014; Simmons et al., 2008; Somerville
et al., 2013), there may be an explanation for these results.
In the current study, the dominant source of uncertainty was
outcome uncertainty of threat (i.e., if a threat (shock) would
occur or not), whereas in previous studies there have been
multiple sources of uncertainty of threat (i.e., if, when, and
what type of negative picture would be displayed) (Schienle
et al., 2010; Shankman et al., 2014; Simmons et al., 2008;
Somerville et al., 2013). Many parameters of uncertainty in
combination may be perceived as more threatening
and arousing in general, but particularly in individuals who
score higher in IU. Therefore, in a context where different
parameters of uncertainty are combined, threat cues are more
likely to engage circuitry, such as the amygdala and insula,
and arousal-based physiology, such as SCR, to alert the indi-
vidual to this particular situation of threat. Our results and
previous research need to be further explored and replicated
to fully understand how IU modulates neural circuitry under
different parameters of uncertainty of threat—ideally in a sin-
gle study where different parameters of uncertainty of threat
are isolated (i.e., if, when, and what; instructed vs. uninstruct-
ed) (Bennett, Dickmann, & Larson, 2018; Davies & Craske,
2015; Mertens & Morriss, 2021; Morriss, Bennett, & Larson,
2021; Morriss, Biagi, & Dodd, 2020).
The medial prefrontal cortex has been implicated in threat
regulation and safety-signalling (Etkin et al., 2011; Milad &
Quirk, 2012; Tashjian et al., 2021). In this task, higher IU was
associated with greater recruitment of the medial prefrontal
cortex during threat versus safe cues. Given that the contin-
gencies were instructed, this finding may reflect attempts to
update the value of the threat cue as less threatening or safe in
individuals with high IU. The modulation of activity in this
area by IU is in line with prior work showing high IU individ-
uals to recruit more medial prefrontal cortex during the extinc-
tion of threat versus safe cues, where the values of cues change
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Table 1 Regional activation patterns in response to stimuli presented in the threat of shock task
Task Brain region BA Voxels Max Z Location of max Z
(mm3) x y z
Threat of Shock (Cue Period)
Threat > Safe L amygdala, insula cortex, frontal operculum cortex, inferior
frontal gyrus, frontal pole, middle frontal gyrus,
supramarginal gyrus, postcentral gyrus, precentral gyrus
44/10/6/8/9/40/1/3 5722 4.35 -36 14 0
Threat > Safe R amygdala, insula cortex, frontal operculum cortex, inferior
frontal gyrus, frontal pole, middle frontal gyrus
44/6/8/9/40 4791 4.43 40 12 16
Threat > Safe R parietal operculum cortex, middle temporal gyrus,
supramarginal gyrus
21/40 3144 5.17 52 -42 6
Threat > Safe Cingulate gyrus, paracingulate gyrus 24/32 1344 4.18 -8 2 40
Threat > Safe Superior frontal gyrus 6/8 313 4.01 -6 40 54
Threat > Safe Posterior cingulate gyrus 23 308 4.1 16 -18 38
Threat > Safe R Superior frontal gyrus, precentral gyrus 6/8/4 282 3.58 16 0 66
Threat > Safe x IU paracingulate gyrus, frontal medial cortex, frontal pole,
superior frontal gyrus (medial prefrontal cortex)
32/10/9 894 4 2 58 30
Threat > Safe x IU paracingulate gyrus, Frontal pole (rostral dorsomedial
prefrontal cortex)
32/8 258 3.12 14 46 32
Threat of Shock (Cue and Anticipation Period)
Threat > Safe L insula cortex, frontal operculum cortex, inferior frontal
gyrus, frontal pole, orobtial frontal cortex, putamen,
caudate
47/45/44 3184 5.94 -32 22 12
Threat > Safe R insula cortex, frontal operculum cortex, inferior frontal
gyrus, frontal pole, orobtial frontal cortex, putamen,
caudate
47/45/44 2979 5.24 34 24 -8
Threat > Safe Cingulate, paracingulate, juxtapositional lobule cortex 24/32/4/6 2447 4.67 2 10 62
Threat > Safe R supramarginal gyrus, parietal operculum cortex 40 1421 4.77 56 -42 40
Threat > Safe L supramarginal gyrus, parietal operculum cortex 40 1359 4.66 -56 -24 18
Threat > Safe Brain stem, thalamus 1292 4.44 2 -16 -10
Threat > Safe Cerebellum 540 3.85 2 -50 -24
Threat > Safe Occipital pole 17 393 4.45 34 -98 0
Threat > Safe Precentral gyrus, middle frontal gyrus 4/6/8 338 3.96 42 4 52
Safe > Threat posterior cingulate, precuneus cortex, occiptial pole, lingual
gyrus, L hippocampus, R hippocampus
23/7/17/18/19 18491 6.11 10 -56 18
Safe > Threat Subcallosal cortex, paracingulate gyrus, frontal medial
cortex, frontal pole,
12/25/32/10 4671 6.44 4 48 -8
Safe > Threat L superior frontal gyrus, middle frontal gyrus 6/8/9 924 4.27 -22 22 38
Safe > Threat R superior frontal gyrus, middle frontal gyrus 6/8/9 727 4.74 24 32 44
Safe > Threat L superior temporal gyrus, middle temporal gyrus 22/38 668 4.48 -64 -8 -14
Note: Corrected cluster for multiple comparisons at p < 0.05. BA = Brodmann Areas. Location of cluster's maximum Z are in MNI space. R = right; L = left.
Fig. 3 Significant clusters from the instructed threat of shock task for all participants during the cue period. Typical regions activated during threat and
safety were observed. The red clusters are from the Threat > Safe contrast. Coordinates in MNI space; R, right; S, superior; A, Anterior
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Fig. 4 Significant clusters from the instructed threat of shock task for all
participants during the cue and anticipation period. Typical regions
activated during threat and safety were observed. The red clusters are
from the Threat > Safe contrast and the blue clusters are from the Safe
> Threat contrast. Coordinates in MNI space; R, right; S, superior; A,
Anterior
Fig. 5. Significant clusters from the instructed threat of shock task during
the cue period by individual differences in self-reported intolerance of
uncertainty (IU). For threat vs. safe cues, high IU was associated with
greater activation in the rostral dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and medial
prefrontal cortex (see bottom of figure for correlations). Such prefrontal
regions are thought to be related to safety-signalling and conscious threat
appraisal. Coordinates in MNI space; R, right; S, superior; A, Anterior
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from threat to safe (Morriss et al., 2015). Higher IU also was
associatedwith greater dorsomedial rostral prefrontal cortex to
cues signalling uncertainty of threat of shock versus safety
from shock. In a recent meta-analysis, the dorsomedial rostral
prefrontal cortex has been suggested to underlie conscious
threat appraisal during instructed threat conditioning
(Mechias et al., 2010) and generally involved in estimating
threat (Grupe & Nitschke, 2013). Therefore, in the context
of instructed threat of shock, greater engagement of the
dorsomedial rostral prefrontal cortex may reflect conscious
threat appraisal in individuals high in IU. Alongside these
neural findings, we also observed individuals with high IU,
relative to low IU, to rate the threat cue as more aversive. The
IU-related effects for the ratings provide further evidence that
individuals with higher IU found the threat cue aversive, de-
spite being instructed about threat and safe contingencies.
Although unexpected, IU-related effects in the medial pre-
frontal and dorsomedial rostral prefrontal cortex were only
observed for the cue period (and not the trial period) during
the instructed threat of shock task. Tentatively, these findings
suggest that individuals with high IU may find the cue period
to be particularly salient, as this is the point at which estimates
of threat and safety can be computed. Perhaps, in the context
of instructed threat of shock, individuals with high IU, relative
to low IU are motivated to identify the cue to estimate threat
and safety based on previous contingency instruction.
However, once the cue is identified and the “risk” is known,
individuals with high IU show similar anticipation of the out-
come to that of individuals with low IU.
In neurobiological models of uncertainty and anticipation
(Grupe & Nitschke, 2013), the medial and dorsomedial rostral
prefrontal cortex are thought to be involved in estimating
threat and uncertainty, and signalling safety respectively.
Notably, evidence-based therapies, such as Cognitive
Behavioural Therapy (CBT), are designed to improve flexi-
bility in estimates of threat, safety, and uncertainty in anxious
populations (Clark & Beck, 2011; Saklovskis, 1996).
Therefore, the IU-based modulation of neurocircuitry impli-
cated in estimates of threat, safety, and uncertainty within this
study demonstrates promise for IU as a fundamental dimen-
sion in neurobiological models of uncertainty and anticipation
(Grupe & Nitschke, 2013; Peters et al., 2017), as well as a
potentially useful transdiagnostic treatment target in evidence-
based therapies, such as CBT (Dugas et al., 2003; Oglesby,
Allan, & Schmidt, 2017; Robichaud & Dugas, 2006).
The study did have a few shortcomings and limitations.
First, while the study did include practise trials that provided
participants with experience of the temporal structure of the
task (i.e., anticipation time before shock), the study did not use
an explicit countdown to the shock (Shankman et al., 2014;
Somerville et al., 2013), which could have been beneficial to
remove any additional sources of temporal uncertainty of
threat. Second, the generality of these IU-related findings
should be tested in future studies using aversive stimuli other
than shocks and with different reinforcement rates of cue-
signalled uncertainty of threat (Chin, Nelson, Jackson, &
Hajcak, 2016). Lastly, the sample was relatively small and
contained only female participants. Future studies should
aim to recruit larger samples from more diverse community
or clinical samples (Hiser, Schneider, & Koenigs, 2021).
Taken together, these results suggest that, during cue-
signalled uncertainty of threat, IU is specifically related over
STAI-T to activation in prefrontal cortical regions. These pre-
liminary findings highlight the potential of IU in altering
safety-signalling and conscious threat appraisal mechanisms
in anxiety disorder pathololgy (Brosschot et al . ,
2016; Carleton, 2016a, 2016b; Grupe & Nitschke, 2013;
Hirsh et al., 2012). Further research is needed to explore the
generalisability of IU-related effects during cue-signalled un-
certainty of threat, and how individual differences in IU mod-
ulate different parameters of uncertainty of threat (i.e., if,
when, and what, as well as instructed vs. uninstructed)
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